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Abstract—Reputation is a well established means to deter-
mine trustworthiness in online systems in various contexts,
e.g. online transactions, product recommendation, e-mail spam
fighting, etc. However, typically these reputation systems are
“closed” outside of the community: the set of participants,
their possible actions, their evaluation and the mechanism to
derive trust evaluations are predetermined in the system design.
Therefore, existing information is hardly reused and emerging
online communities have a “cold” start regarding trustwor-
thiness. In this paper, we discuss the various opportunities
that arise by combining reputation information from different
communities and provide a detail discussion on related chal-
lenges, namely identification, mapping of reputation semantics,
contextual distance, reputation disclosure (dis)incentives and
privacy. For example, the critical issue of identification can
more effectively be dealt with based on entity-matching and
the social structure of different systems. Furthermore, we
argue and theoretically prove that even naı¨ve combinations of
reputation values from different communities can result in a
system capable of detecting misbehavior more effectively than
the individual reputation mechanisms themselves under certain
conditions on reputation semantics.
Keywords-online communities, trust inference, open systems,
identity equivalence mapping
I. INTRODUCTION
Reputation is a well established means to determine trust-
worthiness in online systems. A large number of reputation-
based trust systems have been proposed, as comprehensively
reviewed in [1]–[3]. Also, a number of commercial examples
exists in various contexts, e.g. online transactions (eBay1,
ePier2, iKarma3), product recommendation (Amazon, ePin-
ions4), or e-mail spam fighting (TrustedSource, Trend Micro
Email 5). These systems calculate reputation values based on
previous actions of the participants and probably on refer-
rals to estimate future behavior of participants or expected
quality. However, typically these reputation systems are
“closed”: very little information about the user communities
and the reputation mechanisms being used are exchanged
with other systems. For example, the set of participants in
most cases is known only within one system. In addition,
1www.ebay.com
2www.epier.com
3www.ikarma.com
4www.epinion.com
5www.trendsecure.com/portal/en-US/tools/security tools/emailid
possible actions of users, the evaluation of their behaviors,
and the mechanism to derive trust from such user interac-
tions are predetermined in the system design. Hence, each
system exploits the history of users’ actions in a closed
environment. This is in stark contrast to the open nature
of the Internet where no firm system boundaries and stable
specifications of actions and information exist.
Nowadays, new online communities dynamically emerge
in various contexts through the exchange of views and
services among systems. The trustworthiness of the members
of these communities is evaluated from scratch (i.e. all
members are considered equally untrustworthy, “cold start”).
However, this is not socially optimal, as the members
of these communities are often also members of existing
communities, possibly employing different virtual identities,
and their trustworthiness in these contexts has already been
evaluated.
A reputation system in a closed community is able to
recognize specific untrustworthy behavior patterns within
that context, given the structure of the community, the
structure of the reputation system, and the history of ac-
tions in the context. However, people actively participate in
various online communities, such as social networks (e.g.
LinkedIn6, myExperiment7, Facebook8), online transaction
environments or product review sites. Reputation and behav-
ior of a user in a system may well be related to his reputation
and behavior in another. Combining reputation information
for the same members from different contexts may be more
effective a mechanism for identifying additional patterns
of malicious behavior within each individual context. Thus,
reputation systems should take advantage of not only diverse
information sources in the Internet, such as social networks,
recommender systems, content sharing systems, or semantic
search engines, but also other reputation systems.
In this paper, we investigate the various issues re-
lated to reusing existing reputation information from dif-
ferent contexts, namely identification, mapping of reputa-
tion semantics, contextual distance, reputation disclosure
(dis)incentives and privacy. For example, there is a cost
6www.linkedin.com
7www.myexperiment.org
8www.facebook.com
associated to integrating reputation information from many
systems that has to be compared to the benefit from opening
them up. We also identify several opportunities for doing so,
such as the ones described above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in
the next section, we motivate the opening and exchanging
reputation information among different systems and present
possible opportunities for doing so. We then summarize the
most relevant initiatives and related work in Section III.
In Section IV, we prove, based on a generic model, that
the combination of reputation information is beneficial for
the case of an emerging community from two existing
reputation systems. Section V identifies and gives a detailed
discussion of various research challenges related to reusing
reputation information and combining existing reputation
systems. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITIES
In this section, we investigate various benefits of opening-
up reputation systems, exchanging reputation information,
and combining different systems and various opportunities
for doing so. The combination of various reputation systems
is expected to lead to a combination of benefits even
beyond of them individually achieved by each system for
the following reasons:
1. Trustworthiness information from one system can be
used as prior information to learn user behaviors in
another. Therefore, “cold start” of trust estimation can
be avoided in an emerging community.
2. The estimation of trustworthiness in emerging commu-
nities does not solely rely on pre-specified reputation
data from existing ones and can take advantage of
diverse information sources in the Internet, such as
social networks, community platforms, recommender
systems, content sharing systems or semantic search
engines.
3. Shared but hidden assumptions of communities on
values and evaluations of actions can be discovered by
reputation aggregation across communities that other-
wise would be hard to discover and specify.
4. In dynamically formed emerging communities, self-
organizing community processes form an agreement
on the instantiation of the reputation model for a
given context. These processes involve identifying and
structuring sources of reputation data, extracting and
agreeing on behaviors of interest (in particular specify
malicious behavior) and their evaluation, and establish-
ing shared evaluation metrics. The obvious source for
building reputation metrics is relevance feedback from
participants to determine categories of behavior and
their evaluation. In this process, a community norm is
compared and adapted based on the norms of other
communities such as recommender systems, emergent
semantic systems and web-ranking systems, and it can
identify sub-communities with shared interests. To this
end, a reputation system cannot be applied in these
communities a priori, without hindering their forma-
tion. Emerging reputation systems can be introduced
a posteriori and address trust issues as soon as com-
munity norms on expectable behavior and community
assumptions have converged.
5. For identification, emerging reputation systems do not
exclusively rely on system-internal identity but on Web-
based entities, which are digital footprints in the Web
and therefore not easily manipulated. Also, employing
graph relations from different communities and com-
plex network metrics (e.g. clique), emerging reputation
systems have a better potential to counter identity
attacks, which are a major problem in closed reputation
systems. Therefore, aggregating reputation information
from different contexts is expected to more effective
in discovering collusive groups and in dealing more
effectively with “Sybil” attacks [4].
6. Beneficial attributes of each trust computational model
applied to different communities can be combined
together when reputation information from different
communities is utilized either inside each existing com-
munity or in an emerging one. Combined reputation
information is expected to be more robust and resilient
against attacks from users with various opportunistic
and malicious behaviors. This opportunity is investi-
gated in Section IV.
III. RELATED WORK
One of the first initiatives (2008) to opening reputation
systems is that of the OASIS standardization forum. Specif-
ically, an Open Reputation Management Systems (ORMS)
technical committee [5] has been founded to provide the
ability to use common XML data formats for representing
reputation data and standard definitions of reputation scores.
The standards will provide the means for understanding
the relevance of a rating score within a given transaction
across communities, but not the algorithms for computing
the scores.
[6] introduces a software prototype to store ratings
of users participating in different online-discussion fora.
This work assumes complete trustworthiness of the identity
provider and the users have full-control on the disclosure of
actions and reputation information across communities.
The building of open reputation systems is also well-
related to existing works on federated identity manage-
ment [7]. For example, [8] defines a PKI framework for se-
cure referral dissemination across communities. [9] proposes
a generalized approach to model contextual environment of
an agent and compute its trust values in a new context
based on distance with the related situations. Emerging stan-
dards such as OpenID9 and OpenAuth10 enable the creation
portable identities and allowing community managers to
delegating access to users across system boundaries.
The use of Semantic Web RDF models as FOAF (Friend
Of A Friend)11 to weave social networks and SIOC
(Semantically-Interlinked Online Communities)12 to weave
social activities such as blog comments could provide a com-
plete interlinked graph on top of existing applications. Also,
different community semantics can be expressed in meta-
models such as OWL13. However, the adoption of common
ontologies or schemas is still relatively slow. Moreover, the
process of community building is highly dynamic. Emergent
communities may dynamically form within existing ones
with different interactions and objectives. As explained in
[10], semantic interoperability should be viewed as an emer-
gent phenomenon constructed incrementally, and its state at
any given point in time depends on the frequency, the quality
and the efficiency with which negotiations, such as those
defined in [11], [12], can be conducted to reach agreements
on common interpretations within the context of a given task.
Specifically, in [12], semantic interoperability is addressed
by means of local schema agreements between data sources
through queries and gossiping of schema mappings. The
quality of semantic mappings is gradually improved by a
feedback algorithm until to finally achieve global agreement
selecting the right data sources for schema translation.
Commercial solutions for aggregating online reputation
information related to a person are available and are be-
coming increasingly popular, such as Online Reputation
Monitor14, Reputation Manager15, or Reputation Defender16.
However, these are mainly entity matching web search
engines [13], as opposed to identity equivalence mapping
explained in Section IV, that neither automatically check
the accuracy of information nor aggregate it into a single
trustworthiness metric.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
attempt to systematically study and analyze the benefits and
challenges of exchanging and combining different reputation
systems to improve system performance.
IV. BENEFITS OF COMBINING REPUTATION MODELS-
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a generic model for the
combination of two different reputation systems, in order to
investigate the benefit of exchanging reputation information.
Herein, we consider the two reputation systems being used
9www.openid.net
10www.openauth.net
11www.foaf-project.org
12www.sioc-project.org
13http://www.w3c.org/TR/owl-ref/
14http://reputation.distilled.co.uk/
15www.reputationmanager.com
16www.reputationdefender.com
in a similar application contexts. Therefore, ratings and
reputation values in one system are well-defined and relevant
(i.e. meaningful) to the other. An example of two such
systems are the online e-commerce sites eBay17 and ePier18,
which employ similar reputation mechanisms.
We want to evaluate whether such a combination of two
reputation systems leads to any improvement of the robust-
ness of each individual system against user misbehavior.
Specifically, we measure the resilience of the combination
of two systems, each of which is designed to be resilient
against a certain misbehavior model. Our goal is to quantify
the improvement (in terms of overall resilience) of the
combined system as compared to each individual system
and to measure the synergy effect of such a combination, if
any.
We assume that community managers and initiators pro-
vide basic support for identifying and structuring relevant
reputation data for mapping it into a representation with
shared semantics. Therefore, we enable effective exchanges
of reputation data and combination of information from
different systems. For simplicity, each community manager
is assumed to be trustworthy. This issue is discussed in detail
in Section V.
A reputation-based trust system can be formally described
as in Def. 1. As defined therein, we only consider single-
dimensional reputation values with common and well-defined
semantics.
Definition 1: A reputation system R is a 6-tuple R =
〈U , id,K,H, T ,A〉 where:
• U is the set of usernames in the system. This infor-
mation is usually public.
• K is the set of credentials to verify user identities. In
most cases K is private, i.e., only known by the owning
user and the community manager. Example credentials
are emails, public keys, or even physical addresses.
• id : U → K is the system identity verification method
(which may be done during the registration phase).
• H = {hu : u ∈ U} is historical performance data of
all users.
• T is the set of completed transactions among users.
• A : U × T × H → {trustworthy , undecided} is
an algorithm operating on H and outputs a value
determining if a user u ∈ U is trustworthy for a given
transaction t ∈ T .
Let B = {bu, u ∈ U} be the overall behavior model
of all users, where bu is the behavior of a user u on
the probability space. We make no assumption on each
individual behavior bu, thus the overall model B summarizes
any possible malicious and opportunistic behaviors of any
participants, including any collusive actions of a group.
The misclassification error rate of a reputation system
17www.ebay.com
18www.epier.com
R = 〈U , id,K,H, T ,A〉 given a user behavior model B
is defined as the expectation that the system misclassifies
behaviors of any user for a transaction (Def. 2). A lower
misclassification error rate implies a higher resilience under
malicious behaviors of users.
Definition 2: Let 0 ≤ e(u, t | A,B, hu) ≤ 1 be the
probability the algorithm A misclassifies a user u as trust-
worthy for a transaction t ∈ T , given the rating history
of the user hu and the overall behaviors of all users B.
The misclassification error rate of the system given the user
behavior model B is s =
∑
u∈U,t∈T
e(u,t|A,B,hu)
|U||T | . The system
resilience under the behavior model B is r = 1− s.
Denote hu ‖ ∆u the integration of two historical perfor-
mance data sets hu and ∆u of a user u. In this work, we limit
our analysis to those algorithms A satisfying the following
Hypothesis 1. Such a hypothesis is practically reasonable
with a wide range of algorithms, since a better learning result
is usually expected given more data.
Hypothesis 1: e(u, t | A,B, hu) is a monotonically de-
creasing function of | hu |. In other words, d(∆u,A,B) =
e(u, t | A,B, hu ‖ ∆u)− e(u, t | A,B, hu) ≤ 0
Let us combine two systems R1 and R2 with
the same identity credential set K. Denote Ri =
〈Ui, idi,K,Hi, Ti,Ai〉, where Hi = {hui : u ∈ Ui}, i = 1, 2,
our goal is to combine R1 and R2 in order to achieve
an overall resilience that is better or, at least, not worse
than, each individual system under any misbehavior model
Bj , j = 1, 2. The integration of more than two systems can
be done similarly.
For example, let A1 be a dishonesty detection algorithm
designed to discover collusive groups of malicious users
who consistently vote in favor for each other (possibly for a
limited group size). Let A2 be another algorithm that detects
periodical changes in behaviors of users, where period is
finite. We seek to investigate if, combining the two systems
R1 and R2, the final system is able to detect both collusively
malicious and periodically changes of behaviors. Moreover,
we want the resilience of the integrated system to be higher
than the resilience of each individual system.
We shall show that such synergies can be achieved by
combing the knowledge of two systems. Particularly, we
exploit the fact that many users participate in both systems
and their behaviors can be derived by aggregating their his-
torical performance statistics in both systems. The detection
of common participants of the two systems is related to the
problems of alias detection and entity resolution in security
and database research communities. For example, in [14], the
authors managed to identify a large number of user identities
from anonymized Flickr and Twitter data sets by analyzing
their relationships with others with a very high accuracy,
even if the two data sets are not strongly overlapped.
Basically, such an identity equivalence mapping can be
done based on many information sources: First, many users
use the same credentials in both system that uniquely iden-
tify them from the others (a.k.a. their digital footprints). For
example, a user may use the same e-mail address to register
as participants in the two systems. Other typical credentials
can be detected from similarity in IP source addresses,
correlations in posting timestamps, etc. An example solution
to automatically detect such identity equivalences from
various information sources is presented in [15]. Second,
even if users use different credentials, equivalence among
their usernames in two systems can be derived by analyzing
the (trust) relationships among these users with the others.
For example, methods to look for matching hidden patterns
and structural stenography among users in the trust graphs of
two systems [14], [16] can be applicable. Figure 1 illustrates
the possibilities of such an identity equivalence mapping.
Suppose three users u, v, w forms a collusion group in
the first system R1, and other users u′, x, y form another
collusion in R2. By combining the two systems, algorithm
A1 can be used in both communities to detect the two
collusive groups effectively. Since u and u′ actually use the
same credential, e.g., the same email for identity verification,
they are revealed to be associated to the same user. We
can then estimate that v, w is related to x, y with certain
probability.
system R1
system R2
x
y
u’
v
u
w
u, u’ have
the same credential 
w and y are possibly 
related identities
collusion group 1 collusion group 2
Figure 1. Inferring identity equivalence in the two reputation systems
based on known knowledge and relationship analysis.
In this paper, we do not investigate specific solutions
to this problem, but we assume the availability of an
appropriate identity equivalence mapping mechanism for the
integration of the two reputation systems. We define as
τ = {u ∈ U1 : ∃v ∈ U2, id1(u) = id2(v)} the set of
usernames with the same identity credential in both systems.
Similarly we can define τ ′ = {u ∈ U2 : ∃v ∈ U1, id1(u) =
id2(v)}, and | τ |=| τ ′ |. Def. 3 formally introduces the
notion of identity equivalence mapping between two user
communities.
Definition 3: An identity equivalence mapping between
the user communities of two systems R1 and R2 is defined
as:
ide : U1 × U2 × τ → [0, 1] (1)
The function ide(u, v, τ) gives the probability that user u ∈
U1 is the same as user v ∈ U2, knowing the relationship
among users and the initial set of equivalent identities τ .
We denote as τ∗ the set of users that can be reliably
detected as common in both system by identity equivalence
mapping given τ . Formally, τ∗ = {u ∈ U1 : ∃v ∈
U2, ide(u, v, τ) = 1}, and presumably τ∗ ⊇ τ .
Similarly, we have τ ′∗ = {u ∈ U2 : ∃v ∈
U1, ide(u, v, τ
′) = 1}, where τ ′∗ ⊇ τ ′, and | τ∗ |=| τ ′∗ |
(see Figure 2).
system R1
U1, T1
system R2
U2, T2
τ
 
T
*
τ
τ’
τ’
 
T’
*
Figure 2. Combination of two reputation systems
Given the above notations, we introduce and analyze the
resilience of the following naı¨ve combination of the two
reputation systems (Def. 4).
Definition 4: The naı¨ve combination of two reputation
systems Ri, i = 1, 2 is a reputation system R =
〈U , id,K,H, T ,A〉 defined by:
• U = U1 ∪ U2 − τ
∗
.
• H = H1 ‖ H2 is the combination of historical data
from R1 and R2. Specifically: H = {hu1 ‖ hu2 : u ∈
τ∗} ∪ {hu1 : u ∈ U1 − τ
∗} ∪ {hu2 : u ∈ U2 − τ
′∗}.
• T = T1 ∪ T2
• A = A1 ◦A2 is the combination of two algorithms A1
and A2. Under A, a user u is evaluated as trustworthy
iff given the same history of u, each A1 and A2
independently evaluates u as trustworthy.
Let sij =
∑
u∈Ui,t∈Ti
e(u,t|Ai,Bj ,h
u
i )
|Ui||Ti|
, be the misclassifica-
tion error rate of Ri given that the user behavior is Bj , where
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose that Ai is designed to be more robust
against the behavior model Bi than to the model Bj , j 6= i,
it follows that sii ≤ min {sij , i 6= j}, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Denote si =
∑
u∈U,t∈T
e(u,t|A1◦A2,Bi,h
u
1
‖hu
2
)
|U||T | the mis-
classification error rate of the naı¨ve combination of two
systems (Def. 4) given the user behavior model Bi, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 1 gives us the estimation of the resilience of the
combined system.
Proposition 1: Let | U2 |= α | U1 |, | T2 |= β | T1 |, and
| τ∗ |= γ | U1 |, where 0 ≤ α, β, γ ≤ 1. An upper-bound
of the worst-case misclassification error of the combined
system is given by:
(a) s1 ≤ s11+αβs21(1+α−γ)(1+β) .
(b) s2 ≤ s22+αβs12(1+α−γ)(1+β) .
Proof: Due to symmetry, we only need to prove (a).
We note that under any user behavior model Bj , j = 1, 2,
Def. 2 and Def. 4 give us:
e(u, t | A1 ◦ A2,Bj , h
u
) = e(u, t | A1,Bj , h
u
)e(u, t | A2,Bj , h
u
) (2)
From Hypothesis 1:
d(δ
u
,Ai,Bj) = e(u, t | Ai,Bj , h
u
k ‖ δ
u
)− e(u, t | Ai,Bj , h
u
k) ≤ 0 (3)
where i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}.
Let T ∗ ⊆ T1 (resp. T ′∗ ⊆ T2) be the set of transactions
where estimates of behavior of users in τ∗ (resp. τ ′∗)
are made, the total misclassification error TME by the
combined systems is given by:
TME
△
=
∑
u∈U,t∈T
e(u, t | A1 ◦ A2,B1, h
u
1
‖ h
u
2
) =
∑
u∈τ∗,t∈T ∗
e(u, t | A1,B1, h
u
1
‖ h
u
2
)e(u, t | A2,B1, h
u
1
‖ h
u
2
) +
∑
u∈U1−τ
∗,t∈T1−T
∗
e(u, t | A1,B1, h
u
1
)e(u, t | A2,B1, h
u
1
) +
∑
u∈τ′∗,t∈T ′∗
e(u, t | A1,B1, h
u
1
‖ h
u
2
)e(u, t | A2,B1, h
u
1
‖ h
u
2
) +
∑
u∈U2−τ
′∗,t∈T2−T
′∗
e(u, t | A1,B1, h
u
2
)e(u, t | A2,B1, h
u
2
) (4)
On the other hand, considering reputation systems sepa-
rately, the sum SME of their misclassification error is given
by:
SME
△
=
∑
u∈τ∗,t∈T ∗
e(u, t | A1,B1, h
u
1
)
+
∑
u∈U1−τ
∗,t∈T1−T
∗
e(u, t | A1,B1, h
u
1
)
+
∑
u∈τ′∗,t∈T ′∗
e(u, t | A2,B1, h
u
2
)
+
∑
u∈U2−τ
′∗,t∈T2−T
′∗
e(u, t | A2,B1, h
u
2
) (5)
Since 0 ≤ e(.) ≤ 1, each term in Eq. (4) is less than the
corresponding term in Eq. (5). Using Eqs. (2),(3), we then
have:
TME − SME ≤
∑
u∈τ∗,t∈T ∗
d(h
u
2
,A1,B1) (6)
+
∑
u∈U1−τ
∗,t∈T1−T
∗
0
+
∑
u∈τ′∗,t∈T ′∗
d(h
u
1
,A2,B1)
+
∑
u∈U2−τ
′∗,t∈T2−T
′∗
0
=
∑
u∈τ∗,t∈T ∗
d(h
u
2
,A1,B1)
+
∑
u∈τ′∗,t∈T ′∗
d(h
u
1
,A2,B1)
△
= Φ(τ
∗
, T
∗
, τ
′∗
, T
′∗
) ≤ 0 (7)
The left-hand size of (4) can be rewritten as:
TME = (| U1 | + | U2 | − | τ
∗
|)(| T1 | + | T2 |)s1 (8)
We also have:
SME = | U1 || T1 | s11+ | U2 || T2 | s21
= | U1 || T1 | (s11 + αβs21)
Thus (a) follows naturally.
Suppose sii > 0 and let sji = δisii, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i,
where δi ≥ 1. Given Proposition 1, it is apparent that the
combination of the two systems results in a better system
if and only if si ≤ sii, i = 1, 2. This is equivalent to the
following condition:
fi =
(1 + α− γ)(1 + β)
1 + αβδi
> 1, i = 1, 2 (9)
The condition (9) is satisfied if and only if:
1 < δi <
α+ β + αβ − (1 + β)γ
αβ
and γ < α+ β
1 + β
(10)
for 0 < α, β < 1.
The combined system has a benefit factor of fi =
(1+α−γ)(1+β)
1+αβδi
under the user behavior model Bi compared
to the individual system. Figure 3 shows the benefit factor
for some example α, β, and γ values, i.e., a lower bound
on the expected effectiveness improvement by combining
different reputation systems.
Thus, the benefit factor reaches the maximal value for
δi → 1, i = 1, 2. This condition is equivalent to s11 ≈ s21
and s12 ≈ s22, or that the two systems have approximate
resilience under any behavior model B1 and B2. In other
words, it is best to combine two systems with comparable
performance against different behavior models to achieve
the highest synergy among them.
From Eq. (7), one can also derive a tighter bound between
s1 and s11, s21 than the one of Proposition 1. This new
bound depends on the function Φ(τ∗, T ∗, τ ′∗, T ′∗), which
can be estimated numerically given certain assumptions on
the shape of the error function e(.) (Def. 1). In such a case,
it it apparent that the resilience of the combined system
(represented by s1, s2) is even better. The synergy achieved
in this situation is dependent on the set of common users
τ∗ and related transactions T ∗. The thresholds of τ∗ and
τ ′∗ to ensure the combination is meaningful and effective,
as clearly shown, are | τ∗ |=| τ ′∗ |> 0.
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Figure 3. Benefit factor fi vs. δi, i = 1, 2
In summary, the total benefit (i.e, overall system resilience
improvement under a mixture of behaviors) achieved by
exchanging data and combining two reputation systems is
contributed by two main factors: (1) The combined accu-
racy of two misbehavior detection algorithms, and (2) the
effectiveness of the mechanisms for the reliable discovery
of common users τ∗ that enables effective reuse of user
historical performance data for better evaluation of their
behaviors.
V. OPEN ISSUES AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
The possible benefits of opening up various reputation
systems and combing them for synergic benefits are not
without fundamental challenges that are not addressed in the
previous analysis. In this section we give a detailed discus-
sion of these open issues, and correspondingly identify many
interesting related research questions deserving further work.
Issues are presented in order of relevance and importance in
our opinion.
Incentives for openness: Aggregating reputation within
a community is a costly process. Furthermore, reputation
information can be considered as a feature of the community
and it is a public good for the members of the community.
Therefore, it is not straightforward that community managers
have the incentive to disclose reputation information to other
communities, especially if the latter are competitive ones.
This information is considered a business secret. For ex-
ample, eBay.com19 is unlikely to share reputation data with
another e-trading system20. Community managers may have
the incentive to improperly manipulate reputation informa-
tion. To this end, a trustworthiness metric should be attached
to each community regarding the accuracy of reputation
information reported. Also, incentives for accurate reputation
information exchange have to be provided, i.e. exchange on a
reciprocative basis or buying/selling reputation information
[17]. To a larger extent, automatic protocols for fair data
exchange among different systems may be required.
The disclosure of information on identities and their rela-
tions are also of high importance. Moreover, raw transaction
data could also be useful. Usually, online communities do
not provide any inside information to outsiders for free. For
example, Facebook’s user profile data are valuable informa-
tion to market researchers and thus can not be given for
free by Facebook. Peering agreements among communities
to share reputation-related information could create exter-
nalities for both communities by increasing their credibility
to the users. This scenario particularly makes sense for
federated small communities that are thus able to calculate
trustworthiness more effectively over a larger user and trans-
action base and alleviate the “cold start” problem. Therefore,
smaller communities are expected to be more willing to re-
ciprocate. On the other hand, large well-established commu-
nities are not expected to be willing to disclose reputation-
related data for free. Economic incentives can be provided to
them by means of payments to provide reputation, identity
or raw transaction data. However, in that case, competition
among reputation-related information providers would arise.
The accuracy of reputation or identity information, the size
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of the community, the number of competing providers and
the number of clients would determine actual prices. A
federated group of many small communities can eventually
be a strong reciprocative partner for a large system. For
example, eBay may eventually lose members if ricardo.ch
exchanges data with eBay’s competitor alibaba.com21.
Privacy issues: The Internet exposes personal information
without providing any incentive for accountability. This
information is subject to aggregation on-demand by various
commercial systems, such as Spokeo.com. However, systems
for aggregating such personal information may thus use
unreliable information sources and even fake data, which
may severely affect the reputation of a person. Improving
reliability of information sources in emergent reputation
systems may be a substantial aid in fighting malicious
publication of personal information, disfamation attacks and
contribute to better protection of personal privacy and in-
tegrity. However, the aggregation of even accurate reputation
information and its linkage to a person may raise privacy
concerns for the members of online communities. To this
end, individual actions and interactions inside a commu-
nity should not be linkable to real identities, but only to
pseudonyms. Moreover, only relevant reputation information
should be communicated across communities.
Identity equivalence mapping methods: One of the most
critical short-comings of closed reputation systems is the
possibility of whitewashing behaviors by acquiring cheap
identities. In an emergent reputation system, the virtual iden-
tities of the participants can be related to existing contexts
such as social networks or Semantic Web entities. How-
ever, how are identities resolved when integrating reputation
systems from different communities? First, certain online
communities may employ membership based on real-life
attribute credentials. For example, ricardo.ch is an example
of an auction site using physical addresses as a means of ver-
ification of user identities. Some social networks may even
employ real identities or real life addressing for membership.
Second, users may employ the same credentials across
several communities. Third, indirect identity resolution tech-
niques by analyzing correlated patterns of actions across
different contexts to disambiguate the identity of participants
can be well applicable. As entities in the Web constitute
digital footprints, they cannot be easily created or changed
and entity management in the Semantic Web (e.g. Friend-
Of-A-Friend) allows increasingly relating information from
widely spread resources to a subject of trust evaluation [13].
Another indirect way for identity resolution would be to
combine information from different trust and rating graphs.
This is analogous to the use of social network analysis. It has
been proved in [14], [16] that if only the a limited number
of links are known in an anonymous social network, it is
possible to discover the true identities of all other nodes of
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the network. Also, employing graph relations from different
communities and complex network metrics (e.g. clique),
it is possible to discover collusive groups and deal more
effectively with “Sybil” attacks.
Accuracy of identification and incentives provided:
However, entity matching (i.e. identity resolution) among
different contexts may be inaccurate. In this case, reputation
and trust graph information is improperly mapped introduc-
ing some noise into trustworthiness estimation. Therefore,
the incentives to users for acceptable behavior may get dis-
torted. The relation between the accuracy of entity matching
and the resulting incentives for users after aggregation of
reputation information from different communities has to
be investigated. This is partially answered in Section IV.
Also, the aggregation of reputation information across com-
munities and the subsequent trust evaluations also influence
the dynamics inside communities. For example, a member
evaluated as untrustworthy by other communities will be
regarded as less trustworthy inside a community where it
behaves cooperatively. As a result, the member’s dominant
strategy in the latter community is not to cooperate. It
thus requires much more effort from the particular member
than others to be regarded as trustworthy in an emerging
community.
Reputation semantics, community structure, and sys-
tem dynamics: Reputation within a certain context is cal-
culated based on the specific metrics of reputation within
that context (i.e. how is good reputation defined, how is
rated), the specific computational trust model in use [18],
the community structure and dynamics (i.e. interactions),
the community norms on what is good or bad behavior
(i.e. reputation semantics) and evaluation criteria. Past trans-
actions may be rated or not, by one or both transacted
parties, and with quantitative or qualitative feedback. The
feedback messages are aggregated based on different trust
computational models that may also weight the significance
of the ratings by the credibility of the raters and take into
account other factors, such as the transaction context factor
(i.e. size and kind of transaction) and the community context
factor (e.g. common incentives or beliefs) [19]. Rating,
reputation, credibility metrics and the metrics of any other
factor for reputation calculation and their semantics may
have to be shared across different communities for reputation
transferability.
To this end, OASIS standards [5] will provide the means
for representing and understanding the relevance of a repu-
tation score across communities, but not the algorithms for
computing the scores. However, the context of a community
also has to be effectively modeled and described. The se-
mantic distance of the contexts has to be calculated in terms
of relativeness or usefulness (as opposed to lexicographical,
linguistic or physical) distance between their attributes [20].
Also, different communities have different assumptions and
structure. The way that their members interact, their common
knowledge, their beliefs and expectations are different. As
a result, even the same physical entity, being member of
different communities may act differently. For example, con-
sider a member of eBay that is reluctant of giving negative
feedback fearing provider’s retaliation, while in Amazon,
the same person is very strict in her evaluation and mostly
provides negative book reviews. Therefore, the assumptions
and the structure of each community have to be taken into
account when aggregating reputation from different contexts.
For the description of the context, the context structure and
its assumptions a shared model language that is expressive
enough is needed.
Different communities may have different norms on which
behavior is acceptable or not. Therefore, a physical entity
with consistent behavior across communities may have high
reputation in one community and low reputation in another.
The evaluation criteria are also affected by the community
norms but also from the context structure and community
assumptions.
Metrics for evaluating reputation accuracy and effec-
tiveness against malicious behavior: A trust computational
model is able to identify certain patterns of misbehavior,
but based on the specific characteristics of the model and
the membership policy of the community, it may also have
certain vulnerabilities, such as the incorporation of inaccu-
rate or biased feedback. Several approaches for dealing with
inaccuracy of feedback within one context are described in
Section III. In many online communities members employ
pseudonyms that cannot be mapped to real identities. As
a result, the members of these communities may employ
multiple virtual identities and strategically manipulate repu-
tation information, e.g. by promoting themselves or their
friends and by demoting their competitors. This form of
malicious behavior is referred to as “Sybil” attack and some
approaches that deal with it within a context are described
in Section III. Accuracy of reputation information within a
context has to efficiently estimated and its significance into
reputation aggregation across contexts to be appropriately
adjusted.
Integrating raw transaction data or reputation infor-
mation: When integrating ratings and trust values rather
than raw transaction data, the underlying semantics of gen-
erating these rating have to be taken into account. It is
interesting that, depending on the trust evaluation model
employed, the same reputation data can lead to quite di-
verse evaluations [21]. Furthermore, the dynamics and the
structure of a certain community have to taken into account,
e.g. kind of transactions, frequency, etc. Also, the credibility
of feedback for raw transactions and the reliability assigned
to a community for the reputation information provided is
very important.
Integration cost vs. benefits: Aggregation of reputation
information across different communities requires identity
resolution, collection of reputation information and trustwor-
thiness estimation taking into account the aforementioned
issues. Therefore, as it involves considerable communication
and processing latency, it is not considered as feasible to
be done on demand. Also, it is very costly in terms of
communication to continuously exchange reputation infor-
mation with other communities for all of their members
or to continuously run crawlers for this purpose. A hybrid
approach combining proactive crawling over other commu-
nities for the reputation information of selected members
of the community and on-demand reputation information
requests for some members to other communities seems to
be a more appropriate solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a first step towards the systematic
identification of the benefits and the opportunities of opening
up different reputation systems and exchanging information
across them. We have analyzed and quantified (based on a
simple model) possible benefits of a combined system. We
have found that synergies of different reputation systems
can be achieved from two main factors. The first source
of performance improvement comes from the combination
of reputation estimation algorithms with different accuracy
under different misbehavior models. The second comes
from potential discovery of common participants in the
two systems. This discovery enables the effective reuse and
integration of reputation information from many systems to
evaluate user behaviors more accurately. We also provide an
extensive discussion of many challenges related to the issue
of opening-up reputation systems. Addressing these issues
requires dedicated solutions for several interesting research
questions across many research communities.
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